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The Emergence of a Middle Class among German Turks: A Move toward Cultural
Pluralism
(Under the direction of Dr. Alice Cooper)
This thesis examines the recent development of a middle class among the current
Turkish community in Gemiany. By following the generations of individuals of Turkish
descent from the original guest-workers arriving in Germany in the early 1960s on to the
third and fourth generations of German Turks, the process of middle class establishment
over time becomes apparent. Paralleling the emergence of Turkish middle class,
increased acculturation or cultural assimilation has occurred, which is also described
herein in terms of generational accomplishment. Finally, this work seeks to determine
the relationship between middle class status and integration among this migrant group in
Germany. While a causal relationship is not evidenced, a correlation may be discerned,
and an environment of cultural pluralism among the dominant German group and the
migrant Turkish group may be discovered.
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I
The picture of Turkish integration within the existing society in Germany is
painted with varying shades of optimism and pessimism, dominated largely by a
brightened economic outlook. A middle class has emerged within the Turkish
diaspora in the past few decades that has ushered in an auspicious future for the 2.5
million Turks living and working throughout the country.* In addition to the
economic good fortune of Germany or the Turks themselves, this middle class rise
among a heretofore isolated ethnic group may have  a significant influence in terms of
integration. This work will explore the development of said emergence and the trend
towards cultural integration it might possibly push further. Beginning in the 1960s
with the arrival of the Turks in Germany, this paper will chronicle the establishment
of a Turkish community in the Federal Republic, the humble but steady rise of the
newly established middle class, and the process of integration of a migrant class into
the native society.^ It is the assertion of this work that the two, obtaining middle class
status and integration, at least correlate and perhaps relate to each other in a more
causal fashion. The evidence will, for the most part, be examined according to the
three generations of Turkish descendants in currently Germany. Through
examination of the Turks’ substantial participation in the Germany, particularly as
entrepreneurs, and the increasing level of education obtained by German-Turks, as
EU-Turkish Relations
Dossier. Center for Studies on Turkey, (Essen). http://www.zft-online.de/projekt/e proiekt.htnil.
^For the purposes of this paper the labels “Turk” and “person of Turkish descent” are the same and
equally apply to immigrants, descendants of immigrants, political refugees, and naturalized citizens.
Ay^a Kili^li. “Turkish Migrants in Germany, Prospects of Integration.
1
well as material consumption, professional achievement and household income, it
will become clear that since their arrival in the 1960s the Turks have formed a middle
class. Using an established tool in migrant-integration assessment, the degree of
assimilation of the Turks into German society will be analyzed in regards to political
participation, religion, day-to-day activities within an ethnic enclave, media-usage,
contact with members of the dominant society, and language competence. By
analyzing both the Turkish middle class participation and its relative depth of
integration into society, it will be made evident that while the Turks are not yet fully
assimilated into the German society and while middle class is not a direct ticket to
cultural assimilation the activities of the new professional and middle class have
aided in the socio-economic move of the Turks from a subordinated migrant group to
an ethnic participant in cultural pluralism.
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Part I. The Arrival and Establishment of a Turkish Community
Arrival
Upon experiencing an economic boom in the post-World War II period,
Gemiany found itself a country of great economic potential without the manpower to
get it there. An aging population and a number of menial jobs unattractive to and left
unfilled by the Germans led the government to institute an aggressive labor
recruitment program targeting poor uneducated citizens of Eastern European and
Mediterranean countries. Approximately 6800^ Turkish men arrived in Germany in
1961, the first year of official recruitment contracts signed with Turkey."* At the time
of the official halt to recruitment in 1973, 712,300 Turkish recruits were working in
West Germany.^ A population comprised predominantly of men,^ the recruited
laborers originated in southeast Anatolia where they received little or no education.
So-called “pull-push factors” in their homeland worked to exacerbate the
circumstances that convinced Turks to seek better opportunities in Germany. The
“push factors,” declining familial landholdings, quickly developing agricultural
^ Faruk §en. Turken in Deutschland: Leben Zwischen zwei Kulturen. (Munich: Die Deutsche
Bibliothek, 1994). p. 15.
* Out of all exporting countries Turkey provided 30% of all skilled guest-workers to Germany. Ayta9
Eryilmaz. “40 Years in Germany—^At Home Abroad.” Documentation Centre and Museum of the
Migration from Turkey, Cologne. 2002
^ $en.p.l5.
^ 20% of guest-workers at the time were women.
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technology, and too few jobs in urban centers, coupled with the “pull factors” of
Western European industries hungry for cheap labor to create an irresistible lure.
Within Turkey itself economic growth occurred, but not rapidly enough to
alleviate high unemployment brought on by recent population increase.^ The scarcity
of work in Turkey and the assurance of employment with wages exceeding those in
their homeland were the impetus for a universal plan among Turks. Intending to
work for a few years while sending pay packets home to their families and eventually
to return to Turkey with money enough to build a home or small business, these
workers were referred to, and thought of themselves, as Gastarbeiter or guest
workers. For its hospitality, Germany would receive a significant economic boost. In
1998 alone, the estimated Turkish contribution to the German economy was €40.2
billion or 2% of overall GDP.^ For its contribution Turkey would gain the economic
boost of remittances as well as longer term benefits of receiving the industrial and
technological knowledge accumulated by workers trained on the job at the expense of
German firms. From 1964 to 2000 Turkish guest workers and migrants working
throughout Europe sent approximately $71 billion (or an annual median average of
2.1% of Turkey’s GNP) to Turkey in remittances.^
In comparison to member countries of the European Community like Greece,
Turkey was somewhat late in forming labor contracts with Germany. Membership in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and negotiations between Germany
^Pankios Panayi. Ethnic Minorities in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany: Jews. Gypsies,
Poles. Turks and Others. (Essex: Pearson Education, 2000). p. 217.
* Andreas Goldberg. “Islam in Germany.” Islam, Europe's Second Religion. (Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishers, 2002). p.38.
’ Ismet Koc and Isil Onan. “The Impact of Remittances of International Migrants on the Standard of
Living of the Left-Behind Families in Turkey.” Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies
Ankara, p.33
4
and Greece (notorious for its disagreements with Turkey) during 1960 seem to have
calmed earlier reservations against offering contracts to a predominantly Muslim
country, secular though it was.
10
Original drafts of recruitment agreements written by
federal labor offices in Gemiany allowed for work permits for two years with the
option of a renewal of three years, required medical examinations of recruits while
yet in Turkey, and left out any possibility for family reunions for guest-workers in
Germany.'' The recruitment agreements made with Turkey were clearly inferior to
those made with EC countries which allowed for family reunions. The process of
obtaining a work contract for a Turkish citizen included, first, receiving detailed
information in the Liaison Office in Istanbul on available positions in Germany,
including job description and number of workers needed; the Turkish Labor
Exchange conveying this information to the appropriate recruits; testing occupational
skills of the workers and physical fitness; and, finally, offering a contract and
transporting the new guest-worker to Germany. A “second-way” into Germany was
to be invited specifically by Gennan employers.
12
Upon arrival, the guest-workers experienced hardship in the housing shortage
already existing in Germany. The workers were housed in hostels, dormitories.
storerooms and barracks sharing one shower among twenty others and toilets among
10
Ayta<p Eryilmaz. “40 Years in Germany—At Home Abroad.” Documentation Centre and Museum
of the Migration from Turkey, Cologne. 2002. p.2.






Living conditions were tolerated because they were not expected to be
permanent and it provided a way to save money.
ten.
Table 1. Turkish Immigration in Germany 1961-Present
|y Eventear
Recruitment agreement with Turkey is begim. 7,116 workers immigrate, the
majority of which are men.
Oil crisis strikes and recruitment stops: No more unskilled non-EC foreign workers
are allowed in. 910,500 Turks are in Germany. More even proportion of women
to men.





Federal-State Commission recommends a foreigners policy.1977
New regulations: residence permit (Aufenhaltserlaubnis) after 5 years; residence
right (Berechtigung) after 8 years.
1978
Ktihn memorandum on need for an integration policy.1979
Migration goals: reduce non-EC immigration, promote voluntary returns, and
integrate those who choose to stay.
1981-82
The Promotion of Readiness to Return law offered incentives to foreign w orkers to




1989-90 New "truly temporary" foreign worker programs launched.
Foreigners law revised: more security for settled foreigners, but newly-arrived
foreigners find it harder to obtain secure residence rights.
1990
TRT, a Turkish state-run television and radio corporation begins to broadcast daily
to Germany.
1990
Eight Turkish immigrants killed in arson attacks in two towns leading to
demonstrations against xenophobic behavior and discussion.
1992-93
Leyla Onur and Cem Ozdemir are elected to the Bundestag, becoming the first
representatives of Turkish descent to become members of parliament.
1994
Schengen border-free agreement goes into effect among Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain March 26,1995.
1995
German Bundestag rejects dual nationality. The federal state of Baden-Wurtenberg
prohibits Muslim women educators from wearing headscarves at school.
1997-98
New law changes basis of German citizenship from blood-relation to place of birth
(in Germany) allowing Turkish children citizenship at birth for the first time.







|to apply for citizenship.
I
i Approximately 2.5 million people (43% of the population) of Turkish descent live
;in Germany;. Approximately 500,000 become naturalized.




Establishment of a Turkish Community
In the 1970s the unexpected oil crises caused considerable economic
downturn for much of the world including the Germans, who found themselves
suffering high unemployment. This downturn, coupled with the appearance of the
baby boom generation in the labor market and the climbing social costs of uniting
guest workers with their daily-arriving relatives, led the German government to call
15
Incentives were then offered from 1983 until 1984 toan end to recruitment.
Gastarbeiter from all countries to return to their home nations. A small number of
Turkish workers accepted, as did the majority of workers from member countries of
the European Community. However, as Turkey was not a member of the EC, there
was no opportunity to return to Germany as a laborer in the future, leading most
Turks to remain and send for their families to join them. This reunification of
families was the source of a doubling in numbers of Turks present in Germany after
1973, although these migrants were granted no work permits. As present day Turkish
Germans continue to seek marriage partners in Turkey to bring to Germany, the
number of Turkish citizens continues to grow, though marginally, in this manner.
Family reunification, as well as better educational opportunities and negative




remain in Gemiany. Globalization of teclmology also allowed for a greater
maintaining ties with Turkey and subsequently a greater degree of trans-nationalism.




The first arrivals began settling in areas immediately surrounding the factories
or other establishments where they worked. Poorer districts such as Kreuzberg in
Berlin also became heavily concentrated with guest workers. These areas are
locations of thriving, predominantly Turkish communities and the wellspring of the
emerging middle class professionals and artists of Turkish descent. Mosques,
Turkish food marts, and other Turkish cultural establishments existing before 1973,
the year of the Anwerbestopp^ or recruitment halt, quickly grew in number.
An unexpected shift within the typically very traditional Turkish community
occurred as women began to join the workforce. For many Turkish men remaining in
Germany after the Anwerbestopp, it was difficult to find work, and the women they
sent for and brought over were left to fend for the family, often as the sole
breadwinner. In many cases family structure and hierarchy underwent a switch in
leadership and authority, as the women who earned the money became co-decision-
makers within the family, and relationships between man and wife became more
Women’s positions as subordinates to the men in their lives, including
17
egalitarian.
sons, rose. Within some marriages, however, women’s increased social and
occupational activity outside of the house led to divorce, when strongly traditional
16
Paniyi. p. 218.




husbands (often natives of Turkey as opposed to their second- or third-generation
migrant wives) disagreed with the “economic and intellectual changes” in their wives.
This has created another break from cultural tradition: Turkish women living alone.
Social safety nets provided by the government in Germany facilitate these women in
their independence.
18
Per 1,000 members of the native German population, only 8.6 children are
19
bom each year. The average birth rate of 1.4 children among German women is
20
well overshadowed by the 2.6 percent birth rate among Turkish migrant women.
Germany, well aware of its reproductive short-comings, has long used economic
incentives to encourage higher birth rates among the population to no avail. The




“Crude Birth and Death Rates for Selected Countries.”
http://www.infoplease.eom/ipa/A0004395.html
The World Bank. Germany Profile.
httD.//devdata.worldbank.org/extemal/CPProfile.asp?SelectedCountrv=DEU&CCODE=De Accessed
4/5/04. UralManQO. “Turks in Western Europe.” Centrum Voor Islam in Europa.
http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/umanco/umanco3.htm. Accessed 4/5/04. This number reflects the
average birth rate among Turkish migrant women in Western Europe. Interestingly, this number is





Age Structure of Native Germans 2002
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The first generation, now over fifty and quickly nearing retirement age, has to
consider how and, more importantly, where they will spend the rest of their lives in
retirement. The Turks, who have planned since arrival in Germany to return to
Turkey for a life of comfort, are deciding more and more to remain in the
Bundesrepuhlik. Typically very traditional and strongly family-oriented, it would be
unthinkable to return without children and grandchildren. Further, after years of
physical labor and bodily wear, many retirees require regular medical attention and
medication for which Germany’s extensive social services cause greater hesitation for
those wanting to leave.^‘ Despite the “new” life established in Germany and the
benefits of remaining, however, Turkey continues to be the “home-land” of the first
generation, which has maintained strong emotional ties to the country and
relationships with relatives and neighbors. For a great many the dilemma is solved
cyclically, spending six months in Germany and vacationing the next six in Turkey.
Whether or not older Turks will ever return home or not is referred to as the “illusion
of the return home.” Having not yet achieved their goals in Germany, many workers
continually postponed going home all the while planning for the Ruckkehr, the return
home, and what was meant to take 5 years has lasted twenty or thirty.
$en. p.33.
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Part II: Turks and Middle Class Status
Explanation of the Middle class
Germany is a country in which it is traditionally difficult to pinpoint a middle
class. The concept of a “middle class” has been reconfigured over tlie centuries.
Historically, Germany has been a country of strong social stratification, in part
because of the guild system that has persisted, in some sense, to the present day.
Residual from the era of guilds, employment seems to designate position in society as
Constant and Zimmerman (2004) write: “in.. .Germany occupations also reflect a
general socio-economic standing.
1,22
Three classes of worker exist in Germany: Beamter, Angestellter, Arbeiter, or
civil servants, salaried employees, and wage-laborers, respectively. Civil servants
and salaried employees, and perhaps elite manual laborers (master craftsmen, etc.)
belong to white-collar employment, while wage laborers fall into the blue-collar
23
category. Entrepreneurs and self-employed belong to an independent category. In
Germany class status is conferred largely based on the criteria of income.
22
Amelie Constant and Klaus Zimmerman. “Occupational Choice Across Generations.” German
Institute for Economic Research. Febmary 2004.
This category will be referred to as Independents with some inter-change with entrepreneur. The
ordering of the German social class is the result of combined information from three books, Phillip
Norton’s, The British Polity (White Plains, NY: Longman, 1991), David Conradt’s The German
Polity, (WhitePlains, NY: Longman, 1996), and Das politische System der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, by Wolfgang Rudizio ((Leske and Budrich: Uni-Taschenbucher, 1987).
12
24
occupational prestige, and level of education completed. However, some jobs
overlap between what might be called blue-collar and white-collar work. In the case
of this paper, middle class status will be conferred on falling into of one or more of
the following categories: the self-employed; skilled workers; civil servants;
professionals.
Faruk $en observes in his book Turks in Germany: Life between Two Cultures
that the Turkish middle class began to establish itself in the mid 1980s. To this new
class belong an increasing number of entrepreneurs, doctors, lawyers, accountants,
teachers, and civil servants.
25
Turkish and German Income Levels and Consumption
Income has long been the clearest indicator of class status for many social
scientists. While income alone might not be the best indication of class membership
in Germany, a country in which citizens across all classes take advantage of the wide
net of social welfare, it is helpful in completing the picture of middle class status.
Average annual household income in Germany for 2001 was $25,350 (since 1989
until the present, statistics for Germany have been provided in terms of West and East
as the conditions in the East are not parallel to the West).
26
Earning an average of
24
Wolfgang Rudzio. Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. (Leske and Budrich:
Uni-Taschenbucher, 1987). p.63.
According to a study of the economic potential of Turkish migrant entrepreneurs in Germany
conducted under the auspices of the Center for Studies on Turkey at the University of Essen, the
number of Turkish entrepreneurs nearly tripled between 1985 and 2000, from 20,000 to just fewer than
60,000.
Different sources yield conflicting figures for this average possibly because of the West/East
dynamic. The official country website of Germany lists $30,350 as the average household income for
2002. However the World Bank’s listed figure most closely resembles the Human Development
26
13
DM 4,144 or 2,118 Euros per month for an annual income of 25,400 Euros in the year
2002, the Turks’ income is nearing parity with the Germans’.
Consumption in Turkish households in 1992 has been shown to be higher than
that in German homes. More Turkish households (66.9%) own an automobile than
German households (52.7%).
29
Moreover, the prestige of the brand of automobile
seems more important to Turks. Turks are more likely to opt for a Mercedes over a
Volkswagen than Germans at 20.4% v. 7.6% compared to 12.4% v. 21.4% for
Mercedes and Volkswagen respectively.^® More HiFi stereo systems are bought and
set up in Turkish homes than German homes. It can thus be seen that consumption
within Turkish households matches if not exceeds the material consumptions of the
dominant German society, an indication of the Turks “catching up.” Moreover, it
may suggest that they have adopted the material values held by native Germans.
Employment, that is rate of work-force participation, is another piece of the
overall picture of middle class participation. In 2001 only 32.8% of Turks (below the
Turkish average of 46.3%) were employed in the labor market, but it is important to
note that a large number of the third generation, who account for over one-third of the
total Turkish population in Germany, and future workers are currently in school and
Report average provided above. Germany, Country Profile. Human Development Reports.
Http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/ctv f DEU.html.
Faruk Sen. “Forty Years Later: Turkish Immigrants in Germany.” f^iew. Spring 2002. p.31.
Using consumption as a middle class indicator in the case of Germany will not be as effective as in
other developed countries such as the United States. Germans are often stereotyped as less
materialistic than other nationalities, while it often happens that economically-rising population groups
might purchase articles as status symbols.








vocational training. Otherwise, the Turks generally maintain an above average level
of unemployment, higher than native Germans and higher than other migi-ant groups.
The average age of Turks is younger than native populations in many European
Union countries and the percentage of women working as part of the Turkish labor
force in these countries is lower compared to other migrant groups.^^ General
economic downturn in Germany in recent years has led to higher rates of
unemployment among the native population (up to 9.6 %) and even higher rates
among the Turks (25%).^^ Perhaps, this trend of job instability helps to explain the
high rate of self-employment among the Turks.
Educational and Occupational Achievement
The Turkish migrant population can be examined as three generations,
beginning with the first contracted laborers to arrive, around 15 percent of the total
Turkish presence. Some overlap exists between the second and third generations
34
which account for 33.8% and 50.5% of the Turkish migrant population respectively.
The first generation, currently older than fifty, has shown little if any social
mobility. Arriving as unskilled and only marginally educated manual laborers from
the poorer regions of Turkey, they were unlikely to have spoken German upon arrival
31 t
‘Turkish Entrepreneurs in the EU.”
http://europa.eu int/comm/enterprise/entrepreneurship/green paper/official contributions de/de turke
istudien essen l.pdf Accessed 10/2/03.
Turks in the European Union.” The Official Website of the Turkish Prime Minister.
http://www.bvcgm.gov.tr/vavinlarimiz/NEWSPOT/2000/Mav/N24.htm.







and are more likely to not have mastered the language in subsequent years, possibly
in the belief that they would one day return home. What education they did receive
was acquired in Turkey and sub-standard to German education at similar levels. As
they arrived in Germany most workers filled relatively the same level positions as
laborers in industry, with over 70% of Turks so employed in 1976 (compare to 58%
in 1991 The employment qualifications of the first generation limited workers to
dangerous, low-paying positions with longer hours, less job security, and “health-
endangering work conditions.
m36
Of the migrant laborers recmited in the 1960s, the
Turkish guest-workers held the lowest education and qualification levels, pushing
them into jobs such as transportation, construction, mining, and shipbuilding, while
their Greek and Yugoslav counterparts worked in higher-skilled, higher-paying jobs
in construction and electronics.37 The members of this generation, rightfully
Gastarbeiter, have, themselves, done little to contribute directly to the development
of a middle class among the Turks. Perhaps, its greatest contribution was in
remaining in Germany for the educational and economic opportunities of its second
generation children. This tme guest-worker class was more or less the pioneers
settling new territory for the cultivation and exploitation of later generations.
In the age group between thirty and forty-nine years old, the second
generation is the harbinger of the middle class, bom (most, not all^^) and raised in
Germany. Educated in German schools, their life chances expanded significantly. In





Some migrant children bom in Germany, especially girls, are sent to Turkey to live with relatives





Germany, being educated in the host country was negatively correlated to return
migration, meaning they are more likely to remain in Gemiany.
would require jobs, and having a greater level of education than their parents no
matter what level they themselves complete, would be suitably prepared for
employment at a higher skill level than their parents. In the period between 1976 and
1991 the number of employed Turks working for salary as opposed to wages grew





Germany. The following figure 2,1 reflects discernible occupational mobility





Turkish Entrepreneurs in the EU.”
http://europa.eu int/comm/enterprise/entrepreneurship/green paper/official contributions de/de turke




Figure 2.1 Occupational Mobility of Turks in Germany 1984-1995.
Turkish Immigrant Workers :  1984 1989 1991 i 1995 i
I
I
Unskilled 36 27 27 22
Skilled 42 42 41 35
Supervisors/Foremen 2614 22 24
Clerks 5 2 3 8
MiddleAJpper level Clerks 2 6 4 8
Independent Professionals 2 1 2 2










Turks 22 35 26 8 8 2
Germans 3 8 16 11 41 12
Source: Wolfgang Seifert. “The Changing Profile of Immigration to Germany: Analysis
over Time.” The INTERNATIONAL SCOPE Review, Volume 4 (2002), Issue 7 (Summer),
Hunout & al, Seifert, 160.“^
42
The numbers in the chart, for the purposes of this paper, only serve to show increase and decrease of
Turkish participation in the work areas listed. The figures are from a study done with German and
immigrant men with the numbers representing absolute numbers thought to be generalizable.
18
Third-generation migrants, aged between fourteen and twenty-nine years old,
have not wholly debuted on the economic scene in Germany as many are still in
school and vocational training. Wliile the strength of their upward mobility in
occupational terms may not be clearly and completely examined, the strict
stratification of the German educational system allows us to preview what success
this generation might have.
43
For this purpose we examine the Turkish presence in
the Realschule, the Hauptschule, and the Gymnasium. All students are taught
together until the fifth or sixth school year, when they are separated into the three
individual types of schools just mentioned according to their academic aptitude. The
Hauptschule provides a general education to students of less ability who are
unqualified for university studies and go on to vocational schools. Of the Turkish
migrant children attending one of the three main school types (more than half of all




The German educational system strictly separates schoolchildren around age 12 by apparent
academic ability. Those whose performance is high enough follow an educational track towards the
university while others follow a track geared towards vocational education. This system is key in
examining social advancement opportunities as many professional careers, obtainable via only a
^versity diploma, are “predestined” by educational track placement.
The school attendance percentages do not include enrollment in special placement schools, night
school programs, and other “special” schools in Germany not representative of the majority Turkish
experience in Germany, and thus do not total 100%. Figures for German students were found the
Federal Statistic Office of Germany, www.destatis.de. Accessed 4/15/04.
44
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Source; “The Integration of Turks in Germany.” Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Berlin. 2002.
Students attending Realschiden also complete a practical, though more
demanding, curriculum which prepares them for owning and operating the family
business or for technical studies for careers as architects or engineers. 17% of
T urkish students matriculate on Realschiden compared to 27% of Gennan school
children. Finally, the Gymnasium, in the past an elite school but now the most
attended school type by all sections of the population, prepares students for studies at
the university level opening up more diverse and professional career opportunities.
Only 11% of Turkish students attend the Gymnasium while 49% of Germans do.
While these figures would forecast a less than sunny outlook for the third generation
as middle class/ professional participants in society, it is necessary to note that the
20
bulk of Turkish-owned enterprises are in sectors requiring little specialized
knowledge or skill (i.e., retail, food service). Also, artists and writers, strictly
speaking, do not always require professional training.
Constant and Zimmerman (2003), in conducting a study regarding cross-
generational occupational choices among both native Germans and guest workers
(from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Spain, Greece, with the overwhelming majority being
Turkish) found the following points that are relevant to this examination of education
and the possibility of generational mobility in the formation of a profession/middle
class:'^^
Those workers who made the “wrong” choice earlier in life are
confined in that occupation for the rest of their productive lives.
Moreover, these results confirm that the older workers are in the lower
ranked occupations.
In general, we find that guest workers are concentrated in the
“traditional migrant occupations.” They are indeed at a disadvantage
with regards to family background characteristics.
Each additional year of schooling increases the odds of becoming a
professional as opposed to a menial worker.
More education increases the probability of occupational upgrading.
That is, more educated individuals have a higher probability of
advancing into occupations that offer higher earnings and social status.
Those immigrants who speak German fluently will be more likely to
choose higher ranked professions, and...less likely to face employer
discrimination.
46
As in the Realschulen that prepare students for taking over a family business
or even the Hauptschulen that prepare students for further vocational training that
would possibly lead to jobs in the blue collar arena and just barely arriving in the
lower middle class status, the “higher,” level of specialized knowledge is
45
Amelie Constant and Klaus Zimmennan. “Occupational Choice across Generations.” (Berlin,
2003).
This observation was found true for both native Germans and guest workers.
46
21
not attained. In Gcmiany this specialization comes through university education.
Among the Turks 30,000 were enrolled in university in 2002^^ and only 7 % hold a
university leaving certificates as compared to 28% (1999 figures) among the entire
population in Gcmiany. Figure 2.4 illustrates the dispersion of Turkish university
students among the main subject areas. Law, business, and social sciences attract the
majority of these students, while harder sciences like engineering are not too far
behind.
Figure 2.4





Q Mathematics and Science
□ Language, Literature, and Cultural Studies
□ Law, Business, and Social Science
■ Medicine
Source: “The Integration of Turks in Germany.” Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Berlin. 2002.
47
Faruk §en. “The Role of Turkish Communities in Europe.”
http://www.turkishdailynews.com/old editions/12 12 03/feature.htm
22
Entrepreneurship
The story of Turkish socio-economic evolution is clearly told by one glance at
entrepreneurship according to generations: the original Gastarbeiter account for 11%
of entrepreneurial participation; the second generation 65%; the third generation 24%.
Subject to a higher level of unemployment than other immigrant groups and the
native Germans, Turkish Gastarbeiter began already in the 1960s and 70s to work for
themselves in Turkish businesses. However, as Faruk §en explains in Turks in
Germany: Life between Two Cultures^ family-owned businesses and entrepreneurship
were developments belonging mostly to the second generation. First generation
workers coming to terms with the hopelessness of financial independence and success
in Turkey passed on as seed what resources could be saved along with their dreams of
success in Germany to their children. The early 1980s saw huge growth in interest in
entrepreneurship among the Turks. Between 1985 and 2000, the number of Turkish
entrepreneurs in Germany more than doubled."^^ Andreas Goldberg attributes this
increase in Turkish entrepreneurialism to two factors: increased education of later
generations and lack of positions in the labor market.
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Unlike the second-generation inheritors of entrepreneurial dreams, the third
generation moved on beyond comer shops into the technology sector—a move made
48
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possible by increased educational opportunities.^^ Other changes within Turkish
entrepreneurship have occurred across generations. While the bulk of participation
happens in the retail and gastronomy sectors, services have come to represent nearly a
quarter of activity. In a study conducted by the Center for Turkish Studies in Essen in
2003, it was found that younger entrepreneurs are starting up businesses with greater
relevance to their increased education, such as Information Technology services.
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In a study conducted in 2002 by the Center for Studies on Turkey in Essen,
56,800 of the 82,300 Turkish entrepreneurs living in the European Union operated in
Germany. The economic contribution of these entrepreneurs amounted to 6.5 billion
Euros in 2002 alone. In 1995 the annual income of Turkish firms operating 41,500
enterprises was DM 40 billion (20.4 billion Euros).^^ At the time it was expected that
upon reaching a hundred thousand companies the estimated annual revenues of
Turkish businesses would rise to DM 250 billion (127.8 billion Euros), and that the
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number of employees would be around 650,000-700,000, mostly German.
More than financial investment in Germany, self-employed Turks also provide
jobs, not just for family members, but for qualified personnel capable of contributing
to the success of the enterprise. What’s more, in some service sectors, Germans are
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often hired when few qualified Turks can be found. An evolution, a shift in the
position of the Turk as a member of the employment market has occurred, taking the
guest worker from wage laborer to owner of an enterprise/self-employed to employer.
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Constant, Shachmurove, and Zimmemian (2003) point out that immigrants by
their very nature are inherently risk-takers: “They are characterized by a strong
incentive to invest in human capital and have the inner drive to succeed in the host
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country’s labor market. They go on to suggest that initial unemployment and
discrimination as well as a lack of social connections and education compel
immigrants to become entrepreneurs as one of the very few ways to climb socio
economically. As for any national or ethnic group, higher incomes and greater
workplace independence were sources of motivation for the Turks to engage in
entrepreneurship. However, Faruk $en notes that another impulse lies in the desire of
individual migrants to promote a better understanding for the whole of the Turkish
population in Germany.
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After all, entrepreneurs are investing in their “new'
country, securing a future for themselves and German-Turks after them. Strictly
speaking, not all entrepreneurs belong to the professional class now appearing.
The middle class described above is very new, and in light of the high rates of
unemployment and low achievement scores of the Turks in comparison to the native
German population, it must continue to be considered yet forming. Turkish influence
in the German and European economies has indeed become strong, and the Turks
have attained higher levels of professional esteem as well as having increased
enrollment in higher education. This success is great among the Turks, but among the
entire population of Germany this success has not existed long enough yet to congeal
into an established middle class. The Turkish middle class, while yet emerging, is
nonetheless present and active. More than economic influence, the middle class
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In sum, although since the 1950s Germany has become a multiethnic society,
it has yet to become multicultural^^
As it is the assertion of this paper that middle class status and integration of
the migrant Turkish population within the existing host community are correlated,
both elements must be examined for their presence within said community. It has
been established that there is a new and healthy middle class status among the Turks
in Germany. Now the task is to give evidence of integration. It is widely assumed
among Germans that the Turks are not integrated, though much of this adamancy may
lie in the insistence that Germany is not and will not become a country of
immigration. Several assumptions regarding Turkish integration have been tested,
yielding results both supporting and refuting stereotypes.
In examining integration I will seek to determine the relative degree of
integration based on participation in the market place—^to a large extent already in
evidence—and important institutions of society and cultural assimilation based on





Predominant patterns of assimilation or acculturation appear with some
variation throughout sociological study of migration. Borrowing from Milton
Gordon’s seven elements of adaptation, the integration of the Turkish migrants may
be viewed from a sociological perspective.^^ Cultural assimilation, often suggested
to be the first form in the process, requires following the cultural example of the host
society. Speaking the language of the host group, observing important holidays and
adopting popular modes of dress are initial steps in cultural assimilation, which have
been undertaken by the migrants in Germany. Significant attention must be paid to
the fact that cultural assimilation occurs through ''generational changes within
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immigrant groups over time,” specifically within the second and third generations.
Just as attaining middle class status takes time, so does integration, and often.
in both cases, it takes generations. Examining assimilatory progress of generations
allows a look into the depth of integration of any given social group based on the
degree of convergence that might reasonably expected, based on a comparable ethnic
groups’ integration. One could not logically expect high levels of integration among
the first arrivals of a group, but one could confidently anticipate certain levels of
integration among subsequent generations. The following is a generational view of
cultural assimilation followed by a generational look at other elements of
assimilation.
58
Milton Gordon. Assimilation in American Life. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp.72-
73. These seven elements of assimilation refer to in-group migration of ethnic populations into the
Anglo-Protestant culture of the United States. However, the white-European culture, to which Gordon
suggests migrant groups are forced to conform, is not too dissimilar to that of Germany, into which the
Turks must assimilate.




Few first generation Turks spoke any German when they were contracted, and
despite plenty of firm- and social organization-sponsored language courses, their
acquisition of the language did not occur quickly at all. After working all day in
factories and largely manual labor positions, workers had little desire to participate in
evening language classes, especially when they had no long-term plans to remain in
Germany. As the first generation lingered ever longer in Germany, many continued
to believe in the myth of the return home and still did not acquire better German.
This failing naturally precluded them from higher skilled, higher paying jobs as well
as deeper social immersion outside of the strictly Turkish community. Among the
first generation today, the majority (42%) command only “satisfactory” German-
language competence.^' This same age-group, 50+ years old, relies heavily on
Turkish-language television programming and print news sources.^^ This tendency to
use only Turkish media not only limits their German language acquisition and usage,
but also keeps them fairly well informed with the goings-on in Turkey, but less
informed and less involved with what is going in their own city district. Ties to the
homeland, despite the growing desire among retirees to remain in the Federal
Republic for reasons of superior health care and overall higher quality of life, are
continued and less acculturation has occurred, even at this seemingly late stage in








Often referred to as “black-headed” or “Kanacken” by Germans, the second
generation was the first to receive an education in the German system.^^ Growing up
in homes in which German was infrequently spoken, they arrived at school unable to
communicate and incapable of adapting to a system and culture rank with
discrimination. This generation is frequently described as being “caught between two
cultures but part of neither,” uncertain of identifying with Turkey, the land of
heritage, or with Germany, the land of birth. Compounding this sense of confusion,
neither country wholly accepts them. Obviously, they are outsiders in Germany, but
they are Alamancilar (Turkish for “German-like”), outsiders in Turkey as well.^ In a
sense, they are inhabitants of a kind of cultural limbo. Approximately one quarter of
the second generation speak “very good” German while 35% have “good” speaking
ability.^^ More members of this generation watch Turkish and German television
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programming or only German programming versus only Turkish programs.
Among the Turks and individuals of Turkish descent within Germany it is the
third generation that is coming to the fore culturally and professionally. It is from
within this group that German-Turkish cultural icons are appearing with the greatest
rapidity. This is the generation of greatest school and university attendance and
completion. Nearly three-quarters of this generation speak good or very good
German. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the varying language competencies of German-
Turks by age group:
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Figure 3.1 German Language Competence by Proficiency and Age
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Berlin. Berlin, November 2003. p.26
The Integration of the Turks in Germany.” The Embassy of tlie Republic of Turkey in
Much greater cultural assimilation has occurred among this generation. A
recent study of out-migration among Turkish and Yugoslavian guest workers in
Germany shows that fluency in Gemian and higher occupational prestige
31
“significanlly” decreased the likelihood of return migration to native countries.
Third generation Gemian-Turks would for these reasons be less inclined to leave
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Germany, truly the country of their origin. It follows then that their experiences are
those of the society in which they are bom. For the German-Turks, society is a blend
of two cultural experiences. Artists, directors, writers, and performers of all media
have introduced Turkish and German-Turkish themes into the mainstream German
cultural scene through music, films, literature, television shows produced in Germany
with Turkish perfomiers, and art. One such Turkish performer, Kaya Yanar, is a
stand-up comedian with his own television program with a Turkish and German
following. Yanar has an advantage in his identity as a German-Turk—^he can make
jokes about Gastarbeiter and Turkey that a German would be called chauvinist for.
Artists and performers of this generation, like their entrepreneur counterparts, have
found their niche market within their ethnic group, and, like the entrepreneurs, once
they have gained a toehold they have the remarkable opportunity of expanding into
the wider mainstream German market.
The following Figure 3.2 illustrates the frequency of contact with German
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One of the most visible manifestations of lack of cultural assimilation or
continued adherence to the Turkish culture is the hijab, or headscarf that many
women of Turkish descent wear as part of their religious practice. Despite
international attention in recent public policy debates and increased pressure from the
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The federal state of Baden-Wiirttemberg officially banned the wearing of headscarves by any
persons working in public schools in as recently as April 2004.
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German population at large, Turkish women continue to wear the headscarves. The
overwhelming Gemian perception of the headscarf is that it oppresses the women
who wear it. More than the practical meaning of the headscarf, hijab has for some
come to be a sign of deliberate lack of assimilation or the impossibility of
assimilation for a group that is fundamentally different. In 2003 in the federal state of
Baden-Wurttemberg a Turkish teacher was forbidden to wear her headscarf inside the
school. That a teacher, an educated occupant of the professional or middle class,
continues in her religious tradition rather than adapting to the dominant society’s
views of women, is to be within her rights. It is perhaps a sign not of a half-hearted
integration attempt, as some natives perceive, but rather an attempt to exist in two
cultures at once, a path followed by many Turks.
Structural assimilation involves the participation in the core institutions of the
host society, i.e., government, business, education. The appearance of Turks as
employees of the state in the highly regarded civil service sector in Germany is a
clear manifestation of structural assimilation. Structural assimilation among the first
generation is also low. Precious few have received any sort of school leaving
diploma in Germany. Of this age group, relatively few have become naturalized.
Those who are not naturalized obviously cannot take part in the selection of
government through voting or even in government itself.
Marital assimilation has begun, if not to the “significant” degree of Gordon’s
definition. As most Gastarbeiter were either already married at their arrival in
Germany and had their spouse follow them or were traditional arid chose a spouse in
Turkey post-arrival, the first generation is unsurprisingly not assimilated in marital
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terms. Currently, there are approximately 90,000 German-Turkish (or mixed as they
are called in Germany) married couples in Gemiany involving only 4% percent of
individuals of Turkish descent.^^^ Children of such unions would be among the first to
be assimilated on another level, identification assimilation. First generation migrants
would remain children of Turkey, retaining not only citizenship, but being raised and
educated in the culture of their homeland, developing a cultural identification with
everything Turkish. Second or third generation Turks might refer to themselves as
German-Turkish, whereas later generations may come to view themselves as simply
German.
Other components of Gordon’s assimilation theory regarding the absence of
prejudice, deliberate discrimination, and power conflict are not yet apparent, but like
identification assimilation are components (identifying oneself as “German-Turkish”
German”) likely to occur over time and generations. These elements also require
some effort from or change in members of the host culture.
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Along the path to integration, the three generations of German-Turks have had
experiences unique to their cohort, with unique results for integration of their
population as a whole. The first generation, the guest workers who never expected to
remain in Germany, maintained strong ties to Turkey that kept them from integrating
more deeply and made their own children’s stmggle with integration more difficult.
The “Kanacken” of the second generation, were stereotypically “caught between two
worlds” and made some progress within the dominant German institutions and
professions. Finally, the third generation, truly German-Turks and, themselves, more
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Mehmet Ali Irtem^elik, address, Ubersee Club, Hamburg, 3 Nov. 2003.
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at home in Germany than Turkey, has begun cultural assimilation through
participation in the broader Gemtan culture.
Naturalization
Naturalization demonstrates political and social investment in one’s adopted
country. Possession of citizenship is crucial for voicing the concerns of alienated
ethnic groups that pay taxes, contribute to pension funds, and obey the laws of the
land. Individuals who have taken it upon themselves to become citizens of Germany,
which entails forfeiting citizenship in other countries, are, presumably, prepared to
reside in Germany pemianently, and would be aware of the level of linguistic, social,
political, and economic commitment that they were taking on. It is for this reason
that rates of naturalization are important to this examination of integration.
Until the year 2000, Gemian law did not bestow citizenship on Turks (or any
other group) based on location of birth. Rather, citizenship was conferred according
to German ancestry, meaning anyone of German heritage bom and (often) raised
outside of the Bundesrepublik held rights to German citizenship while Turks (or any
other non-German group) bom and raised in Germany could not claim the same
rights. This law,yw5 sanguinis, allowed ethnic Germans living in Eastern Europe for
several generations the right to return to a land they knew little of culturally,
including linguistically, with full rights as citizens. Turks might, however, apply for
citizenship through a long bureaucratic process that would ultimately insist that they
forfeit their Turkish citizenship and passport—a move the majority of Turks were
unwilling to make. This reluctance to forfeit citizenship in Turkey might be a greater
sign of the still strong ties held by many to Turkey.
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Without citizenship and unable to vote for political representatives in
accordance with their specific interests, second- and third-generation Turks could not
express their hopes for the future of their home country. Political activity allows for
input in policy making and policy change. In 2002 only 500,000 or 1/5 of members
of the Turkish community in Gemiany held German citizenship, a figure including
both those who obtained citizenship prior to the 2000 law and those bom in Germany
However, the figures are climbing as more Turks of the second and third
generations opt to take advantage of new rights. The jus soli, “soil-based citizenship”
allows children bom in Germany to at least one parent residing in Germany at least 8
years full citizenship until age 23 before which time they must either renounce their
Turkish citizenship or forfeit his further right to German citizenship. Naturalization
prior to 2000 was available to those having resided in Germany first for 15 years and
later for 8 years, as the laws changed.^* The new law grandfathers in children age 10
and younger at the time the new law was implemented under the same conditions as
children bom in Germany after 2000. As the following chart (figure 3.3) shows,
naturalization has increased significantly over the last decade. Members of the
second and third generations are thought to be the ones taking advantage of new
leniency in becoming naturalized. These Turks have become stakeholders in the fate
of their “new” country and have the right to influence and shape policy directly or
indirectly in the political system. A European Union-wide trend demonstrates the




“Reform of Germany’s Citizenship and Nationality Law.” German Embassy London website.
http://www.german-embassv.org.uk/reform of germanv s citizenshi.html. Accessed 3/10/24.
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Figure 3.3
Source; Czieschc, Dominik, et.al. “Das Kreuz mit dem Koran.” Der Spiegel. 9 November 2003.
pp.82-97. Information given for cases per year.
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Religion
Religion has been thought to be one of the major reasons several migrant
ethnic groups within new host societies would be inassimilable. Buddhism, Islam,
and other religions so closely identified with specific ethnicity and culture are often
considered hurdles to complete integration. How the Turks balance their religion
(and religion-inspired culture) with mainstream culture of native Germans is an
important signifier of integration. As integration is not entirely a one-sided effort, but
a cycle of action and reaction between host and migrant, it is also helpful, ifnot
crucial, to look at the German response to the religion of the Turks.
Religion and cultural differences entailed in religious practice are two of the
greatest dividers between the Protestant or Catholic Germans and the Muslim Turks.
Guest workers from other countries in Southern Europe, though poor and largely
viewed as backward by their richer European brothers, had a common religion and
cultural heritage. Religion as a hurdle to Turkish cultural integration for both
Germans and Turks is evidenced in the current debates over allowing females
Muslims the right to wear the traditional head scarves while at work in schools or
public offices. It is an issue of great debate throughout Europe but most heated in
France, a country observing the strictest separation of church and state, where no
article of any religion (Christian crucifixes, Jewish yarmulkes, or Muslim head
coverings) may be worn in state-funded facilities. However, as of recently, Germany
(varying by federal state) allows cmcifixes and yarmulkes to be worn, but not
headscarves. The decision to forbid wearing headscarves is reported to be in response
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to the article’s fundamentalist political symbolism/" Another difference of these
religious/political symbols in the Gemian consciousness is that highlighted by
Corinna Wcrvvigk-Hertneck: “our children have to learn the roots of Christian
religion and European culture.
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Statements such as Werwigk-Hertneck’s suggest
that Islam may not be perceived as a part of European culture despite the number of
Muslims living and working in European society.
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Approximately 3.2 million Muslims currently live and work in Germany.
Of that figure 68% (or 2.2 million and that out of the total 2.5 million Turks) are
Turkish, making it near impossible to consider Turkish communities independent of
Islam. Upon arrival in Gennany food marts and bathroom facilities did not meet the
specific needs for Islamic-Turks’ special dietary and hygienic requirements. Strictly
kept religious mandates, prayers and sacrifices were difficult to meet for the first
Gastarbeiter who came to Germany. Still today, Turkish children are kept out of
kindergartens by their parents, places in which are highly prized and long-waited,
because lunches provided often include pork.^^ Germany was not prepared for Islam,
and while it may still not be, the Turks and Muslims have grovm tired of the
discomfort and are rectifying the situation themselves.
In a society often discriminatory, the Turks relied on religion as a cultural
insulator. In a recent movement to become more visible within German society,
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Islam is less a hiding place and more a public relations move. Muslims are
constructing mosques with obvious minarets with greater frequency. 141 stand
currently, nearly double the figure from two years ago, with more than that number in
planning. Today there are approximately 2200 mosques and Muslim houses of
prayer within the Bwuiesrepuhlik.
Microcosm Kreuzherg
www.Muslim-Markt.de is one door into an entirely Turkish world revolving
apart from and for the most part unmole,sted by Germany, the country this world has
grown up in. This website, begun by two Turkish brothers, offers contact information
and references for Turks and Muslims working in all professions and service sectors
for other Turks to patronize instead of Germans. In an interview with Der Spiegel,
Germany’s equivalent of Time, the site’s founders Yavuz and Gtirhan Ozoguz,
themselves practicing fundamentalist^^ Muslims, suggest that the Muslim-Markt is an
alternative for individuals such as “fully veiled” women of Islam who must observe
The site is something of an integration paradox, billing
itself as “the internet starting point by and for German-speaking Muslims.
Following the directory of services one may find Muslim lawyers, doctors,
hairdressers, cemeteries, mosques, Muslim-owned housing, travel agencies,
kindergartens (these schools are not provided for by the federal government and spots
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strict propriety in daily life.
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Officials may soon have to pay Islam more attention within the Bundesrepublik. Rival sects in
Turkey have transferred the religious conflict to Germany as the in-fighting had been forbidden within
me secular state of Turkey.
Theil.
This description is self-ascribed in personal testimony at Muslim-Markt.de.







in them are highly prized, especially among Muslims who require specialized diets
and facilities), outdoor flea markets, and schools. Directories for political
organizations, potential marriage partners, Muslim-ovvoied firms and businesses, and
social organizations can all be found on the site. Islamic texts maybe read in German
at the online library, and updates on the boycotts against Israel and any firm or
government supporting the country are also provided. An interesting integrative
element to the site is that besides recognition of Islam, the founders of the directory
require German speaking ability and obedience to the German law of their users.
What this web-site helps illustrate is that the possibility exists for Turks to be
bom, educated, employed, and buried in Gemiany without necessarily acquiring an
adequate command of the language or an understanding of the customs. Essentially,
the areas of intense residential, social, and financial concentration of the Turks may
easily become something of a bubble for those immigrants incapable of or unwilling
to undertake assimilation. Turkish media also adds to the possibilities of an isolated
life within Germany. Andreas Goldberg observes that the wide availability of these
non-German-language social and informational choices has two effects: 1) They
promote an “opting” out of German-speaking society for Turks and 2) they create a
Turkish community living in Germany that is better informed of events in Turkey
than of life in Germany, Globalization and quickly improving technology keep
communication between Turkey and Germany swift and unbroken.
This possibility to opt out of a mainstream German life and exist entirely in
terms of Turkish culture is referred to as parallel societies and may also be a
manifestation of cultural pluralism.
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Turkish Culture in Germany
But the faet is that the third and fourth generations of Turks have brought forth a
middle class who can afford to be artists.
The “ghettos" and “Little Istanbuls” of Germany have become fertile ground
for the establishment of a class of artists among the Turks. German literature classes
in several countries already offer whole courses on Gastarbeiterliteratur (guest
worker literature) and Migrantenliteratur (migrant literature) exploring the German-
Turkish dialogue and multiculturalisni.^’ Mostly third-generation and middle class,
these artists draw on the harsh reality of growing up in poor neighborhoods,
experiencing daily discrimination, and isolation. This common and stereotypical
Turkish experience with crime, discrimination and/or alienation has also been the
subject of many films written, directed and acted by German-Turks. As recently as
February 2004, a German-Turkish director, Fatih Akin, won the top prize in the
German film festival “Berlinale" that is growing in competition with other film
festivals in Cannes and Venice for influence and recognition. Akin’s film was the
first submission from Germany to win the award in 18 years. His film about a
second-generation married Turkish couple in Hamburg struggling with the constraints
of family, tradition, and independence details an increasingly common experience in
Germany, representing a new facet of German culture.
Turkish music infused with traditional and modem musical forms like rap,
techno, and indie rock is becoming increasingly popular in dance clubs throughout
Rudolf Augenstein. “Deutsche Heimat.” Der Spiegel. June 18,2001:25.
Reed College, http://academic.reed.edu/eerman/courses.html. Accessed 3/11/04.
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the country, with expected popularity in the Turkish ones that have begun opening.
Also, Turkish rap groups have garnered a healthy following and are shown with
regularity on German Music Television programs.
Representatives of the Turkish population are entering all areas of mainstream
culture in Germany with an increasingly widened reach. High ratings and accolades
attest to the popularity of the new influences. As well as greater Turkish visibility in
mainstream culture, German acceptance and following of Turkish performers or arts
is an important sign of increasing integration.
The Appearance of the Euro-Turk: Turkey and the European Union
On May 1, 2004, nine countries from Eastern Europe will be officially
absorbed into the European Union. What this means is that over time, an initial
phasing-in period of seven years or so, these countries will integrate themselves into
the Union’s economy and labor market. They will eventually be able to participate in
the free movement of goods, services and people across the intranet of EU-member
countries. Since 1987, Turkey has been applying for its own membership in the
economic union. Membership in the EU will be particularly interesting in terms of
the integration of Turks in Germany. But, first,  a look at Turkey in the EU.
There are currently more than 3.6 million individuals of Turkish descent
living and working in the European Union. Major countries of immigration include
Germany, France, and Holland,^^ Over 82,000 entrepreneurs in the European Union
provide more than 420,000 jobs to EU citizens, Turks and non-Turks alike. Annual
83
“Turks living Abroad.” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. December 2003.
http://www.nifa.gov.tr/gruDa/ac/acb/defaultl.htm Accessed 02/12/04.
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turnover in 2000 was 68.1 billion DM, an increase of 59.5% since 1995.^'* Estimates
calculated by the Center for Studies on Turkey in Essen, Germany, predict a Turkish
presence in the EU 4.8 million strong with 3.4 million of those individuals residing in
Germany by 2015. The number of Turkish entrepreneurs in the EU is expected to
increase to just under one million (960,000) in the same time period.
Migrant Turks tliroughout all of the EU-member countries have often been
referred to as cultural “ambassadors” by several heads-of-state.  Indeed, the current
government in Turkey promotes this image and encourages its citizens living in these
lands to take on citizenship and integrate fully into their new societies. Such a
presence in the European Union states increases Turkey’s stake in the union as an
economic partner, and, it is hoped will ease the eventual integration of Turkey into
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the union.
Turkey is already a member of the Council of Europe, OECD, and NATO, but
hot debate continues over whether Turkey can be integrated for many of the same
reasons it is doubted that Turks living in Gemiany and other countries can be
integrated into these societies; namely religion and “European-ness.” Several heads-
of-state within the EU insist that Turkey is not even geographically European, and for
that reason, despite the country’s long involvement in European affairs, cannot
belong. The so-called Christian Club of Europe is also a force against Turkey despite
its secular government. Germany, for its part, has declared its approval of Turkey’s
application for membership.
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Since llic start of membership applications in 1987 Turkey has implemented
economic, human rights, and other domestic policy changes to move in sync with the
EU. The changes made have often been called “unprecedented” and “revolutionary’
in the breadth of all accomplished. At the upcoming Copenhagen Summit in
December 2004, Turkey has been assured, negotiations in the accession process into
the EU will begin upon evidence of reforms and policy compliance in the country.
Should, in the coming years, Turkey succeed and join the EU, it will be
several years before the employment benefits for the Turkish nationals would be fully
instated. In the meantime, the increasing presence of the Turks in Europe could
conceivably contribute to the integration of current “Euro-Turks.” Perhaps, should
Turkey be accepted in to the European Union, the issue of dual-citizenship, a concern
that causes many Turks to decide against German naturalization and the forfeit of
Turkish citizenship, will become less prohibitive if all Turks—^Turkish Germans and
Turks living in Turkey—are EU citizens. Fanik §en, director of the Center for
Turkish Studies in Essen, Germany was of this opinion: “Those who push these
reasons [religion and culture] when saying that Turkey is not suitable to be a member
of the EU are also endangering the integration of Turks in the EU. Distancing the
country the migrants come from does not make it easy for the integration process.
Turkey’s possible entrance into the European Union could potentially facilitate
increased integration of the present German-Turkish population.
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Part IV. Analysis and Conclusion
Analysis of the Turkish Middle Class and Turkish Integration
II has so far been established in this paper that  a Turkish middle class has
emerged, and it is also elear that Turks are making cultural impressions on Germany
through the increasing Muslim presence and Turkish cultural elements in the arts as
well as participation in the major institutions in the country, which may or may not be
drastically enhanced through later acceptance into the European Union. These two
aspects of the Turkish presence, the middle class and increased visibility (culturally,
politically, professionally), are, as is the assertion of this paper, related,
Entrepreneurialism, a strong force in the development of middle class status
for the Turks, has, in a study by Constant et.al. regarding entrepreneurialism and
immigrants in Germany, been found to be unusually high among Turkish migrants as
compared to other immigrant groups and Germans. They found that
entrepreneurial choice for Turks could disguise a choice against
structural barriers, limited employment choices, and discrimination in
the labor market. Immigrants often experience social exclusion, and
entrepreneurship maybe a way of cutting through it and being
accepted.
Also, some 70% of self-employed Turks preferred to remain in Germany as
Initially, these entrepreneurs draw on ethnic or cultural
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traditional Turkish foods (fast-food style doner kebabs and strong Turkish coffee) and
cultural experiences (i.e., visiting a hamam, or Turkish bath, or taking belly dancing
lessons) is becoming a regular occurrence for members of the native German
population. Turkish culture has become a market of its own as these entrepreneurs, as
well as the new professional class of writers and artists, trade on their diversity and
open a door for greater cultural exchange. Both cultural exchange between two
groups and the adoption of cultural norms by the migrant group are strong threads in
the often multi-stranded course to assimilation.
Links between education, a value of and constant accompaniment to middle
class status, and period of time spent in Gemiany have been found. If a child is
educated in Germany, he are less likely to leave the country if favor of their homeland
It follows that those Turks remaining in Germany for longer
periods of time increase in Gemian proficiency and are more likely to have a
professional career. Naturally, those with higher levels of German speaking-ability
and professional status are likely to be more integrated into the dominant society.
Current degrees of structural and marital assimilation are low, but it only
stands to reason that they will increase through greater contact with other ethnic
groups and, in the case of structural advancement, as naturalization allows greater
institutional access. Positions within the institutions of German society held by Turks
should also multiply as personal stakes in the dominant society increase with
entrepreneurship, ownership, and access to education. Identification assimilation is
an indicator that can and will increase with subsequent generations are bom and come
89
or ancestral homeland.
of age within the Bundesrepublik.
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The following table offers a quick glance at measures of both middle class
status and degree of assimilation.
Table 2 Middle Class Participation and Assimilation






































Low: Only two German
citizens of Turkish
descent have been
elected to the national
parliament. The number
of Turks taking on
naturalization in the last
4-5 years has averaged
40% of total







Degrees of assimilation for this grid will be calculated based on Turkish presence within major
institutions of German society (stmctural), percentage of Turks in mixed marriages with native
Germans (marital), percentage of Turks who identify with Germany (identification), and Turkish
presence within mainstream culture (cultural assimilation). Middle class participation will be measure
vis-a-vis native German participation within the middle class.
Veysel Oezean. “Changes to German Law Help Boost Naturalization Numbers.” Migration
Information Source, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/disDlav.cfm?ID=152. Accessed
4/05/04.
This figure most probably includes East German figures (see footnote 26), but it is yet unclear.
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males is more important
than females), 89% of
school children aspire to
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Education at a Glance: OECD
Indicators , 1997, Table G2.1.
Faruk Sen. “Problems and Possibilities Concerning Turks in Germany.” Turkish Daily News.
http://www.turkishdailvne>vs.com/old editions/07 21 97/feature.htm Accessed 03/12/04.
This figure is an average of the West German (43%) and East German (31%) figures. RICS
European Housing Review. Germany, 2003.






Like most chicken and egg problems, it's hard to know which came first. Did
Jews and other Euroethnics become white because they became middle class?
That is. did money whiten? Or did being incorporated in an expanded version
of whiteness open up the economic doors to a middle class status? Clearly,
both tendencies were at work.
Karen Brodkin, “How Jews Became White Folks’
If one inserted “Turks” for “Jews” and “integrated” or “German” for “white’
in the above paragraph, one would find it quite fits the interests of this paper. Of
course, Jews and Turks have as many assimilation-differences as assimilation-
similarities. Both Jews and Turks suffered under negative stereotypes in each group’s
respective lands of migration (in the case of Jews migrating to the United States) and
both groups practice religions unpopular or of minority status in the land of
immigration. However, Turks have the added difficulty of being easily identifiable as
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Other” due to superficial differences in appearance, whereas some Jewish groups in
the United States would have had an easier time passing as Caucasian/European.
Jews have the somewhat positive stereotype of being economically clever, whereas
Turks came from a backwards and economically troubled country. Linguistically, it
might have been easier for the Jews to assimilate coming from multiple European
language groups without a wide enough population speaking just one language to
maintain a persistent presence of that language in daily life as opposed to adopting the
language of the new host society.
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Whereas lurks are more similar to Jews in terms of appearance upon arrival,
they possibly could emulate the Cuban-American example. Arriving as exiles
welcomed to the United States for, as in the Turks’ case, what was expected to be a
short while, the Cubans became heavily economically integrated, focusing on the
needs of their specific ethnic enclave which grew to be in some sense, an
international hub of commerce between the United States and Latin America. This
economic integration is not taking place, however, into the dominant economic
system, but chiefly among Latinos. At the same time, Cubans are the least culturally
assimilated Latino group due to continued residential segregation and Spanish
language dependence.'^'
By the year 2015 it is expected that the German-Turkish population will reach
an estimated 3.4 million persons, 120,000 of which would be entrepreneurs
98
Currently comprising almost 3% ofanticipated to bring in some 66.5 billion Euro.
the total population of Gemiany, the Turks’ position in German society must be
clearly defined in consideration of the future. Another look at the current age
structures represented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 (p.l2) impresses upon us the need to
integrate a migrant group that will have an ever-increasing impact on the socio¬
economic future of Germany.
Unlike the Jews, Turks are clearly distinguishable from the dominant group
within their new society, and like Cuban-Americans they are a population large
enough to maintain their language and their own niche economy. However, the Turks
are merging along artistic and economic lines with increasing presence in the major
97
Feagin and Feagin p261.
66, 467,944,555 billion Euro or 130 billion DM, as listed by source.
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institutions of Gcmiany. Clearly, a middle class with professionals and artists has
emerged. Turkish cultural figures are becoming more prominent. Overall,
assimilation remains low and is not likely to occur with wide effect linguistically or
regarding religion.
It may be found later that attaining middle class status has, indeed, facilitated
greater integration of Turks within German society. At the present time, the state of
relations between native Gemians and individuals ofTurkish descent might be termed
immigrant subordination in a system of social stratification.^^ Immigrant groups in
such a position within societal stratification are generally kept in place by low
economic, educational, political position within the society. An apt description of
Turkish Gastarheiter and their offspring for the first thirty years of their presence in
Germany, this label will not be representative of the Turks much longer. With their
exhibited strength in and contributions to the German economy, as well as increasing
levels of higher education, Turkish participants are facing a more secure presence
within Gemiany. While not quite assimilated (integrated culturally, politically and
economically as to be indistinguishable from the dominant group(s)), German-Turks
might be said to be participants of cultural pluralism, the egalitarian coexistence of
multiple distinct cultural/ethnic groups within a society (i.e., Chinese-Americans
living in China Towns across the United States). This move from migrant
subordination to cultural pluralism has been largely driven by economic success.
The Turks are emerging as a participant middle class gaining strength in economic
99
Among the accepted model of assimilation among current sociologists it is believed that for
subordinate migrant groups there are three possible outcomes over time: 1) continued subordination 21
cultural pluralism or the coexistence of ethnic groups equally in the same society keeping unique
cultural practices or 3) complete conformity within the dominant group.
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terms (avcra^^c household income, professional status) as well as cultural influence.
and arc Just hci^innin i^ to come into view politically (i.e. naturalization with
accompany ing rights).
WWW.Muslim-markt.de is a strong example of currently developing cultural
pluralism. Fhc online directory of Muslini/Turkish service and cultural contacts
requires a fimi grasp of the Gemian language and obedience to the law of the
dominant society fomis of cultural and structural participation.  In a sense it is
through or within this dominant society that the directory users may access contacts
within their ethnic enclave. Along the sometimes lengthy and gradual road to
assimilation are many way stations. For the Turks, as with most migrant groups, the
move to cultural pluralism from migrant subordination takes several generations, and
the time spent at that point before the next great leap is reflective of the unique
assimilation obstacles faced by the particular cultural group. Importantly, Dr. Fanik
§en writes that, “The false belief that the Turks are not accepted because of their
religion and their culture is an obstacle to the integration process,
Jewish-Americans and Catholic migrant groups in the United States assimilating into
the greater Protestant-Christian society, religion and accompanying cultural practices
need not be an obstacle to integration, but may add to the factors that lead to cultural
pluralism as opposed to out-right cultural assimilation. Cultural pluralism is both
integration and a stage in the gradual move towards assimilation. A great push
towards this level of integration of the Turkish population in Germany has come from
»ioo
As with
the economic strength and professional participation of the new Turkish middle class.
101 $en. “The Role of Turkish Communities in Europe.
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